b'Section 3 of the 2000 Act, however, contained specific limits on the exercise of the well-being power. The first was a limitation on using well-being powers to circumvent other restrictions placed on local authorities in other pieces of legislation (section 3(1)). The second clarified the fact that the power did not enable the raising of money (whether by precepts, borrowing or otherwise) in section 3(2). This confirmed that the well-being powers could not be used as a form of indirect taxation which had particular relevance to the issue of charging for services. A third limitation was that section 3(3) gave the Secretary of State power to make an order which prevented local authorities from using the well-being powers for certain activities. This limitation was described in Parliament as a reserve power. The limitations of the well-being power were highlighted in the Court of Appeal judgment in Brent London Borough Council and others v Risk Management Partners Ltd [2011] UKSC 7 (the Brent case). In fact, many commentators suggested that the judgment was more limiting than necessary but, by the time the Supreme Court overturned the judgment, the general power of competence had replaced well-being in England. Summary 2.8 The law on charging and trading developed in a piecemeal and generally unsatisfactory way until the then Government attempted a fix via primary legislation and introduced the 2003 Act. This statute was designed to enshrine both charging and trading so that such activities were placed on what was hoped would be a firm and clear basis. The way this was achieved, however, began with distinguishing between charging and trading activities which had the unfortunate effect of creating further confusion and uncertainty. Trading by its nature implies charging. In addition, these somewhat fine distinctions arguably did not address the type of trading most authorities wanted to undertake, namely collaborating with other like-minded authorities to reduce costs or make better use of public assets through municipal trading activities. Instead, the type of trading permitted under the 2003 Act permitted commercial trading which could only be carried out through a trading company. Under this legislation, the authority could potentially trade with the world at large (not simply other public bodies) and could seek to make profits from such commercial trading activities rather than merely covering costs (as per charging powers). However, many authorities remained to be convinced that the costs and risks involved in starting a wholesale trading enterprise outweighed the benefits. Curiously, the 2011 Act did not repeal the 2003 Act powers on charging or trading but instead, introduced new charging and trading powers in pursuance of the general powers of competence. The 2011 Act follows a very similar path to the 2003 Act as regards requirements for trading or charging. For example, under the 2011 Act powers the establishment of a special purpose trading company is a pre-requisite for trading (as per 2003 Act) and charging must only be on a cost recovery basis and for discretionary services. The following chapters explore these statutory powers in more depth.44'