b'The principles derived from these cases illustrate that a council cannot simply impose charges on consumers of services unreasonably and without regard to the principles of fair play (even if it can point to express powers to chargethat is only part of the issue). In the Richmond case, however, the sole point at issue was whether the council had power to charge at all. Until Parliament took action to clarify the extent of local governments charging powers (in 2003) councils were only able to impose a charge with certainty where there they could point to an express power or, in the words of Lord Lowry, where the power to charge arises as a necessary implication from the words of the statute. Since one persons necessary implication was highly likely to be another persons ultra vires confusion and uncertainty reigned as subsequent cases continued to explore the parameters of lawful local government charging powers. The necessary implication test 2.5 The Richmond case was decided on the basis that the charging for the giving of pre-application planning advice was incidental to the incidental function of giving that advice, ie a power too far removed for the purposes of section 111 of the 1972 Act. Lord Lowry was not prepared to say that in the absence of express statutory power there can never be a case in which the power to charge arises by necessary implication. He just felt the facts of the Richmond case did not support such an implication. In the Court of Appeal case, Alexandra Palace Ski Centre Ltd v Haringey London Borough Council (1994) Times, 25th May, the necessary implication test was explored further (although surprisingly the Richmond case is not mentioned in the transcript of the judgment). Haringey Council was the trustees of the Alexandra Palace and Park and administered the trust pursuant to special powers set out in two private Acts of Parliament of 1900 and 1913. These Acts authorised the trustees to grant leases of parts of Alexandra Park for recreational purposes, but the statutes did not expressly state that lessees under such leases could be authorised to charge for admission. In 1983, the trustee council granted a ten-year lease to the ski centre which duly ran a commercial skiing enterprise, charging the public for admission and for the hire of skis, boots, lessons and so on. When in 1993 the lease came up for renewal, the Council opposed the grant of a new lease arguing (amongst other things) that the grant of the 1983 lease had, in fact, been beyond the powers of the trust, that the original lease was void as a consequence and the ski centre was not entitled to be granted a new lease under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. Haringey put forward the argument that it had no power to authorise the ski centre to charge admission to the centre because the two enabling statutes were silent on this issue and because in the statutes general provisions it stated that the land should be available for the free use and recreation of the public. Despite this the court decided that the trustee council did have an implied power to allow a lessee to charge the public for admission and could charge for other ancillary services such as ski hire etc. Lord Justice Nourse dealt with the issue by stating that this was something which did not need express provision and that it could be left to necessary implication. He said:40'