b'Chapter 2 Background to legislation governing local authority charging and trading General 2.1 The legislative environment surrounding the topic of local government charging and trading is (and remains) complex. Traditionally, one of the main obstacles to local authorities raising income through charging for services has been the effect of ultra vires doctrine. The high tide of case law impinging on charging activities came in 1991 with the very narrow interpretation of section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972 (the 1972 Act) (powers conducive or incidental to the discharge of functions) taken by a unanimous House of Lords in the case of R v Richmond-upon-Thames LBC, ex p McCarthy and Stone (Developments) Limited (1991) 4 All ER 897 (discussed below). The General Power of Competence (GPOC) contained in the 2011 Act reverses the basic premise that has traditionally impacted by providing local authorities with a general competence power imbuing those local authorities defined under the Act as having the powers of an individual. However, the general competence power, whilst welcome, contains various restrictions and prohibitions, particularly in the context of charging and trading (see Chapter 6 on the 2011 Act and the general competence powers) which significantly impact on the use of the GPOC. . In addition, finding the powers to do something (ie the capacity to undertake an activity) only provides a partial solution to problems and difficulties caused by the ultra vires doctrine. Once identified, powers must be used lawfully in accordance with well-established public law principles (as this work outlines). Consequently, vires issues are likely to remain an important factor to address when proposing or considering income-generating activities, including charging and trading. Understanding why charging and trading has become such a political hot potato over the past few decades may help to avoid problems with local authority charging and trading initiatives going forward. Prior to the introduction of the 2011 Act and the general competence powersas creatures of statute, local authorities could only undertake those activities which Parliament had authorised either expressly or by reasonable inference from the language of an Act of Parliament. Section 111 of the 1972 Act should have mitigated against the effect of this rule, since it empowers authorities to do anything which is calculated, conducive or incidental, to the discharge of any of their functions. However, this provision did not assist Richmond Council when it tried to use it as a basis to make a charge (25) to potential developers for the provision of pre-application advice on development proposals. The charge was meant to recoup some of the costs of officers time taken up with this (discretionary) activity. The Council, when challenged by a developer (McCarthy and Stone) could not identify an express statutory charging power, but it argued that the giving of pre-application planning advice facilitated or was conducive or incidental to its function of determining 35'