b'A power for the trustees to authorise lessees under leases for recreational purposes to charge for admission may fairly be regarded as incidental to or consequential upon the express power to grant such leases. His colleague, Mr Justice Wall, reached the same conclusion, albeit via a different route. He approached the issue from the perspective that provided the purposes for which the lease had been granted were lawful and intra vires, the power to grant a lease must include the power to insert provisions to make it effective. He explained: Where a charging term is required to facilitate the fundamental purposes of the statute it seems to me a matter of construction that it must be imported. Otherwise the power to grant leases would be meaningless. Mr Justice Wall felt it would be nonsensical to have the power to grant a lease to a third party for the provision of a ski centre without the necessarily implied power to permit the lessee to make a reasonable charge for the use of the ski slope. He believed such a term was in no sense inconsistent with the fundamental duties of the trustee council to maintain the park as an open space for the free use and recreation of the public. This wide interpretation of the Councils powers by the Court of Appeal was encouraging, although it was ironic that it worked, in this case, to the detriment of the Council concerned and frustrated the Councils objective of avoiding granting a new lease for the ski centre. The Haringey case did not, as it turned out, signify a more liberal approach to the interpretation of charging powers by the judiciary as the Court of Appeal case of R v Thurrock Borough Council, ex p Blue Circle Industries plc (1994) The Independent, 11th October demonstrated. In the Thurrock case, Blue Circle had granted the Council an option to lease land which had been excavated and was being used by the company for land-fill purposes. Covenants in the option agreement determined the type of waste which the company were authorised to dispose of at the site. Following initial operation of the site on the terms set out in the option agreement the company applied to the Council for consent to vary the terms to enable it to bury loose land-fill rather than high-density material. The Council was quick to spot the commercial advantages to Blue Circle of the proposed variation and replied that it was prepared to consider the variation so long as the company agreed to pay the Council a proportion of the monies which the company would undoubtedly save as a result in the changes in the waste disposal process. Blue Circle challenged the Councils powers to require such a contribution. The Council claimed that the variation amounted to a disposal of an interest in the land and that it was, therefore, entitled and obliged by section 233 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to demand the best consideration which could reasonably be obtained for the variation consent. Section 233 provides that where any land has been acquired or appropriated by a local authority for planning purposes and is for the time being held by them for the purposes for which it was acquired or appropriated, the authority may dispose of the land in order to secure the best use of that or other land. The consent of the Secretary of State is required where the disposal is to be for a consideration which is less than the best that can be reasonably obtained. If a local authority acquire land for purposes other than planning purposes, provisions similar to those in section 233 are contained in section 123(2) of the 1972 Act (ie. the consent of the Secretary of State was 41'