b'planning applications and it could, therefore, properly rely on section 111 in support of its decision to make a charge for this advisory service. The fact that the case reached the courts at all is perhaps surprising, bearing in mind the acknowledged reasonableness of the fee involved and the purpose for which it was introduced. The developer apparently regarded a fee of any sort as an unwelcome additional financial burden to be borne each time a planning application was considered. Bearing in mind the risks and expenses of litigation, the dogged determination demonstrated by the developer in pursuing the point all the way to the House of Lords, despite unfavourable judgments in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, was remarkable. To have then succeeded in persuading the House of Lords to unanimously overrule the Court of Appeal must have been the ultimate vindication of the developers stubborn approach. Councils found themselves between a rock and a hard place. Many wanted to use their resources to assist the community by, wherever possible, utilising statutory powers. At the same time, consistent pressures on public finances meant that there was less money available to subsidise non-essential services. Many local authorities took the position of only performing discretionary functions if those functions were substantially self-financing and there were no doubts about the councils powers to recoup expenses or generate income. The absence of express statutory charging powers became a considerable handicap stifling initiative. Charging controversy 2.2 So why the fuss over whether local authorities can levy discretionary charges for performance of services or functions? Many cases have come before the courts to determine whether particular activities can be said to be implied from the words of an Act or are incidental to a function. Where a statutory body wishes to impose charges or raise income from its activities it remains crucially important to identify its source of authority for doing so (even after the introduction of the general competence powers). Where imposing a charge is concerned, the risk and likelihood of a challenge arising is increased since the levying of any sort of charge is likely to be an unpopular measure, carrying with it a potential for a challenge through the courts by those who are required to pay it. Moreover, a local authority is in a privileged position vis-a-vis an individual due to its ability to raise income from local taxes and its monopoly position with regard to the provision of certain services. Therefore, the courts are likely to look carefully at such cases to protect against an abuse of power by councils. This latter point is illustrated by the words of Wilde CJ in Gosling v Veley (1850) 12 QB 328 at 407 rescued from obscurity and quoted with approval by Lord Lowry in the Richmond case: The rule of law that no pecuniary burden can be imposed upon the subjects of this country, by whatever name it may be called, whether tax, due, rate or toll, except upon clear and distinct legal authority, established by those who seek to impose the burden, has been so often the subject of legal decision that it may be deemed a legal axiom, and requires no authority to be cited in support of it. 36'