Council successfully defends waiting list policy in High Court

The London Borough of Southwark’s choice-based lettings scheme could have been better explained but was not unlawful, the High Court has found.

Claimant Carmen Castro Guallichico argued she had been treated less favourably than others lower on the waiting list for choice based lettings and for the separate direct allocations of homes.

But Jonathan Richards, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, found the scheme operated properly and there had been no breach of laws on transparency or equality.

Ms Castro Guallichico argued that choice based lettings offers did not appear to follow any logical or discernible order and that while some households were marked as ‘enhanced priority’,she could not understand why she was denied this status given her family’s circumstances.

She alleged that Southwark was in breach of its direct offer procedure in her case; had provided insufficient transparency regarding the operation of the direct offer waiting list and was in breach of the public sector equality duty.

Ms Castro Guallichico and her family live in a two-bedroom private sector flat with a living room. Two of her four sons have been diagnosed as having autism spectrum disorder and complex needs, including speech and language delay.

She joined the housing register in 2018, and in 2023 was awarded Band 2 priority, rather than the highest Band 1. In August 2024, Southwark confirmed she had been placed on the direct offer waiting list “in date order”, this list being used for lettings judged urgent outside the choice based scheme.

The following month she issued a claim in the county court alleging a breach of the Equality Act 2010, specifically, due to an alleged failure to make reasonable adjustments, after which she was moved to Band 1.

In January 2025, she was told she was in 19th position on the list for four-bedroom properties and 10th for five -bedroom ones.

But in July 2025, she was told she had fallen to 30th position on the former list and 16th on the latter.

Mr Richards said: “In this case, the challenge is not to the formulation of [Southwark’s] scheme, but with respect to the way it was applied in relation to the claimant.

“Nor has it been suggested that the defendant had a good reason for not applying their policy. The issue simply is whether the defendant breached their direct offer procedure in the claimant’s case or not.”

Southwark told the court the date of entry onto the direct offer list is taken into account, but a range of factors are considered.

Rejecting Ms Castro Guallichico ’s first ground, Mr Richards said: “The direct offers list is an additional, discretionary route in cases of urgency.
“There are a variety of reasons, as set out, why a case might be considered urgent, which are not readily comparable. Priority for a direct offer is set based on the date a household has been agreed for a direct offer but, depending on the urgency of a case, a relevant senior officer may make a decision to enhance the priority for a direct offer. “

He said the scheme worked as stated and "I do not find that there has been any breach of that procedure in this case”.

The second ground concerned whether Southwark provided sufficient transparency regarding the operation of the direct offer list.

Ms Castro Guallichico said there was a lack of clarity and transparency as to how any discretion operated or how “enhanced priority decisions are made.

Mr Richards said: “In all the circumstances, while I can understand the claimant’s wish for more detailed information about how the defendant’s scheme will be operated, I do not consider that the failure to provide such information renders the scheme unlawful.

“Inevitably, there will be many factors relevant to the difficult decisions that the defendant has to make in relation to the allocation of a limited housing stock to a large number of applicants. It is clear that the defendant needs to retain discretion as to their decisions. In all the circumstances, this ground fails.”

He also rejected the ground concerning equalities, saying: “While the claimant is right to observe that her household has been disadvantaged by the way in which the direct offers procedure has been operated by the defendant, there is insufficient material to support a contention that this is because disabled households more generally are disadvantaged or that it results from a failure by the defendant to observe the [duty].”