Forced access to residential property: an alternative route under CPR 25.1?

In Accent Housing v Piatek (unreported, Teesside County Court (10 July 2026), DJ Cook considered an urgent application by a social housing provider for an anti-social behaviour injunction, an exclusion provision and a separate order authorising access to the Defendant’s property.

The application arose from an extremely serious incident involving a 16-hour stand-off with the police. The Defendant had barricaded himself inside the property and indicated that he intended to end his life. It was reported that he had an explosive device and a female hostage with him.

During the incident, the Defendant caused extensive damage to the property. The electricity, gas and water supplies were torn out or interfered with, and the windows were smashed. Although immediate steps were taken to secure the property, substantial remedial works remained urgently necessary to keep it safe.

At the time of the application, the Defendant was being held by the police. There was, however, a risk that he would be released before any criminal charges were laid or he appeared before a criminal court.

The urgent application

Given the seriousness of the incident and the resulting concern for the surrounding community, Accent Housing made an urgent application without notice.

The Claimant sought an injunction under section 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, together with an exclusion provision under section 13. The concern was that the Defendant might be released from police custody and return to the property, creating a risk of further harm. There was also the practical possibility that he would return to a property which his own actions had rendered uninhabitable.

The draft injunction sought to exclude the Defendant from the property and the surrounding neighbourhood. It contained the usual prohibitions against anti-social behaviour, together with terms preventing him from possessing explosive material or threatening its use. It also initially required him to allow the Claimant access to the property.

The application first came before Judge Cook without notice. The judge made a limited injunction addressing the immediate anti-social behaviour but was not satisfied that the exclusion and access provisions should be determined without the Defendant first being given notice.

The judge took a cautious approach to the significant interference with the Defendant’s Article 8 rights. As the Defendant remained in custody, he was unlikely to be able to return to the property during the short period required for service. The more intrusive provisions did not therefore need to be determined immediately without notice.

Following the first hearing, Mr Gilmartin served the papers upon the Defendant directly in custody.

When the application returned, the Defendant had not contacted the court and did not attend. The court was satisfied that the evidence demonstrated violence and threats of violence and that the risk of further harm justified the exclusion sought.

The original injunction was therefore varied to exclude the Defendant from the property and the surrounding area.

However this left the issue of access. If the Defendant was excluded from the property, who could grant access to the Claimant in order for the property to made safe?

The legal issue concerning access

The judge was not content simply to require the Defendant personally to provide access. He remained in custody and was now excluded from the property. Requiring him to attend in order to admit the Claimant would place him in breach of the injunction itself.

Judge Cook raised the differing approaches taken in Sovereign Housing Association Ltd v Hall (unreported, Bristol County Court, 10 July 2024) and Southern Housing v Emmanuel [2025] EWCC 58.

In Hall, the court held that CPR 70.2A could be used to enforce an existing access injunction by permitting the act required of the tenant to be carried out by another person. In Emmanuel, the court took the contrary view that the rule could not create a substantive right of forced entry into a tenant’s home.

Those cases concerned CPR 70.2A, an enforcement provision which applies after a party has failed to comply with an existing mandatory order. The position before Judge Cook was different. There was no pre-existing access order which the Defendant had disobeyed. The Claimant instead sought to gain access through CPR 25.1.

CPR 25.1 permits the court to make interim orders for the preservation or inspection of relevant property and to authorise a person to enter land or a building for that purpose.

Having identified the apparent conflict between the exclusion provision and the proposed access requirement, Judge Cook invited submissions on whether a lawful and workable order could nevertheless be made.

The Claimant’s submissions

On behalf of the Claimant, I submitted that the case was materially different from Hall and Emmanuel. The Defendant was not refusing to comply with an existing access order. He was simply unable to facilitate access because he remained in custody and was to be excluded from the property.

I agreed that an order directed personally at the Defendant would therefore be unworkable. The Claimant was not seeking to enforce an earlier obligation against a disobedient party under CPR 70.2A. It therefore now sought a separate interim order under CPR 25.1, limited to entry for the purpose of preserving and making safe the property.

The urgency of the works also distinguished the case from a routine request for access. Essential services had been affected and the remaining damage created a potential danger to neighbouring residents.

It was further submitted that the works were in the Defendant’s own interests. If the exclusion provision were later discharged or varied, the property would need to be safe and habitable before he could return.

The wider community should not, in the meantime, remain exposed to danger for an indefinite period while awaiting a time at which the Defendant might be capable of facilitating access.

The Claimant accordingly invited the court to distinguish the authorities concerning CPR 70.2A and make a separate order under CPR 25.1 authorising immediate entry.

The court’s decision

Judge Cook accepted the distinction advanced on behalf of the Claimant. As he explained:

“An order requiring the Defendant himself to provide access would defeat his ability to comply with the injunction. If he attended the property in order to grant access, he would be in breach of the exclusion provision.”

The judge was satisfied that access could instead be authorised separately:

“Secondly, I am persuaded that there must be a power available to the court to authorise access. The purpose of the proposed entry is not simply to interfere with the Defendant’s occupation or rights. It is to make the property safe and to make good the damage.”

The condition of the property was central to the decision:

“All of the evidence is that the Defendant has caused significant damage to the property. That damage includes interference with the electricity, water and gas supplies.”

The judge also accepted that the risk extended beyond the property itself:

“Leaving matters in abeyance would lead to an escalation of the danger posed to the surrounding community. I must consider that as a separate and important point.”

The submissions advanced on behalf of the Claimant were therefore successful. Judge Cook concluded:

“I will therefore grant injunctive relief authorising the Claimant forthwith to enter the property and carry out the repairs necessary to make it safe.”

He expressly recognised the substantial interference with the Defendant’s rights:

“I recognise that this represents an interference with the Defendant’s human rights and his rights in relation to his home. However, if the court does nothing, there is a risk to the community which is intolerable.”

The Claimant accordingly obtained both the exclusion provision and the separate access order required to undertake the urgent remedial works.

The significance of the decision

The decision provides an example of access being authorised under CPR 25.1 independently of any order requiring the occupant personally to admit the landlord.

Rather elegantly, Judge Cook did not impose an access requirement which the Defendant could not obey. Having heard the distinction advanced on behalf of the Claimant, he made an order separate to the injunction including an access provision to ensure the preservation and safety of the property.

The case is therefore distinct from Hall and Emmanuel, which concerned the enforcement of an existing access injunction under CPR 70.2A. Here, the court authorised access at the outset under its interim powers, where the Defendant was incapable of facilitating entry and urgent works were required.

Taylor Clark Ltd v Mohamed

Although not referenced within the hearing itself, Taylor Clark Ltd v Mohamed (unreported, Central London County Court, 5 March 2026) provides further support for a practical approach to access.

In that case, the court declined to follow Emmanuel. It held that an access covenant represented prior contractual agreement to entry in specified circumstances and that the practical act of facilitating access could be performed by another person under CPR 70.2A. The landlord was ultimately authorised to force the lock if the tenant failed to comply.

Taylor Clark concerned the enforcement of an existing access injunction. The present case concerned a separate interim order made before there had been any disobedience.

Together, the decisions suggest two possible routes: CPR 70.2A where an existing access injunction has been breached, and CPR 25.1 where immediate entry is required to preserve or inspect property and no enforceable access provision already exists.

Judge Cook did not decide whether CPR 25.1 might also assist where a previous access order exists but the occupant is unable, rather than unwilling, to comply. The decision nevertheless highlights that possibility. It may be artificial to treat a person as disobedient where compliance is beyond their control because they are, for example, in custody, in hospital or excluded from the property.

Whether CPR 25.1 could properly provide an alternative route in those circumstances remains to be determined.

Conclusion

The court accepted the Claimant’s submission that an order requiring the Defendant personally to grant access would be contradictory and incapable of effective compliance.

It instead authorised the Claimant to enter the property under a separate interim order. Although this substantially interfered with the Defendant’s Article 8 and housing rights, that interference was justified by the urgent need to make the property safe and the intolerable risk which inaction posed to the wider community.

The County Court authorities disclose differing approaches and are persuasive only. Until the issue is determined by a higher court, the availability of forced access will remain fact-sensitive.

This decision nevertheless provides a useful example of a practical and effective solution being obtained where an occupant could not facilitate access and urgent intervention was required.

Claire Geller is a barrister at Park Square Barristers.