Ending the Main Housing Duty

R (oao Bano) v LB Waltham Forest and Interveners: (1) Shelter (2) SHLA (30 13 London LHAs [2026] UKSC 22

Summary: The Supreme Court (“SC”) decision has three significant practical impacts:

The ‘Main Housing Duty under Housing Act 1996, s. 193 ends on the occurrence of any of the events set out in the relevant section(s) of s. 193. There is no requirement for the relevant LHA to make a decision that the Duty has ceased after occurrence of those events.
An offer of accommodation that contains a technical error (e.g. in respect of a PRS offer a failure to include the wording required under HA96, s. 195A) will still cause the Duty to cease unless the applicant seeks a review of the offer.
Letters from LHAs confirming that they regard the Duty as having ceased (referred to as ‘confirmatory letters’) do not give rise to a further right of review or of judicial review.

In short, the SC decision gives effect to the language of the HA96, s. 193 and provides certainty for LHAs. In this article we explain how these issues got before the SC and the decision.

Factual background

In January 2017 Mrs Bano made a homeless application to LBWF. On 23.2.2017 LBWF wrote to Mrs Bano informing her that it had found that it owed her the Main Housing Duty, i.e. the duty set out in the HA96, s. 193. That Duty is to secure that suitable accommodation is available for the applicant until the Duty ceases. The Duty can only cease in accordance with one of the relevant provisions in s. 193. There are nine different circumstances in which the Duty ceases; two of those circumstances are where the applicant either accepts or refuses an offer of private rented sector accommodation let on a tenancy of not less than two years. These are referred to as PRS Offers.

From 23.2.2017 LBWF performed the Main Housing Duty to Ms Bano by providing her with interim accommodation. On 15.6.2020 LBWF made Mrs Bano a PRS Offer of accommodation in Derby. The offer met the statutory requirements for a PRS Offer except that it did not include the effect of the provisions of HA96, s. 195A (the failure to include this in a PRS Offer was the subject of the appeal in Norton v LB Haringey [2022] EWCA Civ 1340). Mrs Bano declined to go to Derby and did not take up the PRS Offer. Ms Bano did not ask for a statutory review of the PRS Offer, as she was entitled to do under HA96, s. 202.

Because of the COVID restrictions LBWF did not immediately remove Mrs Bano’s right to occupy the interim accommodation she had been provided with. On 19.8.2020, after the restrictions were removed, LBWF wrote to Mrs Bano informing her that her accommodation had been cancelled with effect from 31.8.2020. Mrs Bano did not vacate that accommodation. The provider of Mrs Bano’s interim accommodation issued possession proceedings on 11.11.2022. There was a hearing on 4.5.2023. On 15.5.2023 solicitors for Mrs Bano wrote to LBWF relying on Norton and stating that as the PRS Offer had failed to include the s. 195A material the Main Housing duty continued. On 30.5.2023 LBWF replied stating that it did not accept that its Main Housing Duty to Mrs Bano continued and that she was out of time for a statutory review and that it would not extend time for a request for review.

The Claim

On 29.8.2023 Mrs Bano issued this Judicial Review (JR) Claim. The decision challenged was LBWF’s refusal, in its letter dated 30.5.2023, to accept that its Main Housing Duty to Mrs Bano was continuing. During the course of the proceedings Mrs Bano’s lawyers developed an argument that the Main Housing Duty did not end until an LHA has made a decision that it has ended and has communicated that decision to the applicant. That was the principal issue before the Supreme Court.

The Judgments below

It is not necessary to review the Judgments below in any detail. However, the DHCJ, Dexter Dias KC granted the Claim holding that an LHA did have to make a post events decision and finding (somewhat perversely) that the LHA did not have to communicate that decision to the applicant: [2024] EWHC 654 (Admin). The Court of Appeal (“CA”) allowed LBWF’s appeal [2025] EWCA Civ 92. However, the CA also held that confirmatory letters give rise to a right of s. 202 review: see [66]. In making that decision the CA was applying obiter dicta from Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC [2011] PTSR 117.

The SC Decision

On the main issue, i.e. whether or not an LHA must make a decision that the Main Housing Duty has ended after the occurrence of the events giving rise to the cessation of that Duty, the SC held that no such decision was necessary @ [97]:

97. The clear meaning of section 193(7AA) is that if an applicant (a) accepts a private rented sector offer, or (b) refuses such an offer, then as a matter of law the local housing authority ceases to be subject to the main housing duty. On the proper construction of the subsection a local housing authority does not subsequently have to: (a) make a decision that the applicant has accepted or refused the accommodation offered and that it accordingly no longer owes the applicant the main housing duty; and (b) notify the applicant of any such decision. We would dismiss this ground of appeal.

Whilst the Judgment relates to PRS Offers, the logic applies to the other 7 ways in which the Main Housing Duty ceases. Although, unlike all the other circumstances that cause the cessation of the Duty, s. 193(5) includes a post events notification from the LHA:

(5) The [LHA] shall cease to be subject to the duty under this section if -

(a) the applicant, having been informed by the authority of the possible consequence of refusal or acceptance and of the right to request a review of the suitability of the accommodation, refuses an offer of accommodation which the authority are satisfied is suitable for the applicant,

(b) that offer of accommodation is not an offer of accommodation under Part 6 or a private rented sector offer, and

(c) the authority notify the applicant that they regard themselves as ceasing to be subject to the duty under this section.

The SC found that the PRS Offer letter sets out the substance of the decision against which the applicant can request a statutory review. That right of review is an alternative remedy, so JR is not available.

The SC considered the outcome where the PRS Offer contains errors of law that would mean that if challenged by a request for a review that review would be bound to succeed. In this case that consideration related to the Norton failure. The SC held that unless the applicant challenges the PRS Offer letter by a request for review, it has the effect of causing the Main Housing Duty to cease even though it is technically deficient: see [40] and [98]:

40. In Norton …, the Court of Appeal held that a failure to comply with the statutory requirement to so inform the applicant in writing meant that the main housing duty had not come to an end. This means, fourthly, that if Mrs Bano had requested a review within 21 days then she could have contended that the Offer Letter had not brought the main housing duty to an end because Waltham Forest had failed to meet the statutory requirement in section 193(7AB)(c) of telling her in writing of the effect under section 195A(2) of a further application to a local housing authority within two years of the acceptance of the private rented sector offer.

98. It follows from our analysis that the Offer Letter notified Mrs Bano of Waltham Forest’s decision for the purposes of section 202(1)(b) that the main housing duty would cease to be owed to Mrs Bano upon acceptance or refusal of the offer. It was not, as the [DHCJ] thought, merely an indication of an intention to bring the housing duty to an end. The terms of the letter were very clear that the offer “will discharge our duty to you whether you accept or refuse” and told her that she would only receive this one offer. Although the Offer Letter was not fully compliant because Waltham Forest had failed to meet the statutory requirement in section 193(7AB)(c), Mrs Bano did not challenge the decision as she could have done, so the decision stands as a valid decision which brought the main housing duty to an end.

So, LHAs can regard the Main Housing Duty as having ended even where there is a technical error in the offer where there was no request for review in the statutory period.

The remaining significant issue affected by the SC decision is whether confirmatory letters, or decisions, give rise to a further right of review? This issue could arise as follows: (1) One of the sets events giving rise to the cessation of the Duty occurs; (2) Subsequently the applicant writes to the LHA asking it to confirm that the Duty has ended; (3) The LHA responds stating that the Duty has ceased. Does the confirmatory letter give rise to a right of review? In Ravichandran the CA stated obiter, that a confirmatory decision was reviewable. This of course gave rise to the risk that applicants who had missed the time limit to request a review could get the LHA to confirm their decision and request a review.

The SC held that confirmatory decisions are not reviewable. This really follows from the decision on the first issue, i.e. that the Main Housing Duty ceases by operation of law and without a subsequent post event decision. At [110] the SC stated as follows:

110. We agree that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that anything other than the Offer Letter was capable of triggering a review of the issue whether the duty had ceased pursuant to section 193(7AA). None of the communications from Waltham Forest after Mrs Bano refused the private rented sector offer amounted to a decision in respect of which she could have requested a review as to whether the authority had ceased to be subject to the main housing duty …

The SC Decision should streamline LHA’s processes and resolves a number of situations in which LHAs may have had concerns that their discharge of the Main Housing Duty was not certain. If an applicant has not requested a review then it is probable that the Duty has ceased.

Nicholas Grundy KC, Millie Polimac, Michael Mullin and Joe Mahon are barristers at Five Paper. In addition to the four barristers who appeared for the Respondent and 2nd and 3rd Interveners in Bano Five Paper has highly regarded Social Housing and Public Law specialists across wide range of call.