Judge allows appeal in homelessness dispute over failure to take into account protected characteristics

HHJ Monty KC heard the appeal brought under s204 of the Housing Act 1996, where Miranda Grell, of 1MCB Chambers acted for the claimant/appellant, who in 2025 made a homelessness application to Greenwich.

He completed a vulnerability questionnaire in which he wrote: “I am a Black gay man with no family support. Cultural and identity factors mean I cannot rely on family for care or accommodation, leaving me isolated and significantly more vulnerable than most applicants.”

Greenwich decided under s184 of the Housing Act 1996 that the claimant was not in priority need, and he requested a review that came to the same conclusion.

His solicitors made representations about his mental health but not about the claimant’s sexual orientation and race.

The claimant appealed to the Central London County Court on the grounds that Greenwich failed to take into account his protected characteristics as a Black and gay man and the resulting increased risk to him when homeless.

Even though the solicitors had not raised these protected characteristics, HHJ Monty allowed the appeal.

HHJ Monty said: “I accept that when considering a section 204 appeal a court should be wary of imposing on the officer a duty to enquire into matters that were not raised in the course of the review…

“However, it seems to me that when conducting a review, the officer cannot ignore matters which are not expressly raised in a review request on the grounds that the matters were dealt with in the section 184 decision where those matters are so intertwined with those which have been made the subject of a review; to do so – and in particular, not even to mention those matters on review – would in my view be an error of law.”

The judge said Greenwich’s officer had “unfortunately fallen into error here” because of a failure to reference the claimant’s protected characteristics in the review decision and how they might relate to his depression and suicidal ideation.

“If that was because the officer felt no need to do so because it had been adequately dealt with in the section 184 decision, it seems to me that the least the officer should have done would have been to say just that,” HHJ Monty said.

He explained his conclusion might have differed had the claimant raised his ethnicity and sexual orientation as relevant matters for the first time in this appeal.

“But he did not. It was always a central part of what he was saying to [Greenwich]. I accept of course that the weight to be given to any particular matter is for the respondent, but if a matter is simply not mentioned, it is impossible to say that any consideration has been given to it at all.”

HHJ Monty upheld the claimant’s first ground saying: “I do not accept that in the particular circumstances paragraph 59 of the decision – which upholds the section 184 decision – can ‘rescue' the decision under appeal by allowing me to treat the decision as having considered and dealt with the matters which are not expressly mentioned in the decision itself.”

He also upheld for the same reason a ground that said Greenwich failed to have due regard to its public sector equality duty.

The clamant also succeeded on a third ground that Greenwich failed to take into account the factors that made him vulnerable.

HHJ Monty though rejected a fourth ground that Greenwich’s failure to make necessary inquiries into the claimant’s suicide risk when homeless, were inquiries that no reasonable authority could fail to regard as necessary.

“When pressed, Ms Grell was unable to identify any inquiry which it is said the respondent ought to have carried out,” he said.

“I do not accept – particularly where an appellant cannot set out what inquiries it is said should have been made – that an appeal court can properly conclude that the Respondent failed to make an inquiry where no other reasonable authority would have similarly failed.”

Mark Smulian