Welfare deputyship case ‘leapfrogged’ to Court of Appeal

According to law firm Rook Irwin Sweeney, in June 2025, the parents of a 22-year-old man, ‘HDEB’, made an application to the Court of Protection to be appointed as his welfare deputies.
HDEB has diagnoses of autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and epilepsy. HDEB requires 1:1 support during the day, waking night supervision and 2:1 support when he is displaying heightened behaviour and when he is in the community.

HDEB lived with parents JB and SB until his needs became too great to be met at home, and he moved to PC in Berkshire where he thrived. When he turned 18, he moved to his current residential placement, BC in South Wales.

Following a hearing in the Court of Protection on 13 January 2026, HHJ Beckley refused the application, determining that it was not in HDEB’s best interests for JB and SB to be appointed as his welfare deputies.

However, he recognised that he had come to a different decision than that of Mr Justice Poole in Parr v Cheshire East Council & Anor [2026] EWCOP 1 (T3), despite the circumstances of the cases being similar, and therefore granted permission to appeal to a Tier 3 judge.

Paragraph 32 of his judgment stated: “I want to make absolutely clear that my decision is not any reflection on JB’s and SB’s love and concern for HDEB nor is it based on any concerns as to their parenting. They are completely committed to HDEB and to his welfare. They understand him and have shown themselves to be very capable of working collaboratively with professionals. HDEB could not have wished for better parents.”

JB and SB made an application to appeal HHJ Beckley’s decision on 12 February 2026 and a hearing was initially listed before Mrs Justice Theis on 5 May 2026.

However, on 27 April 2026, Mrs Justice Theis determined that the appeal should be “leapfrogged” directly to the Court of Appeal, pursuant to Practice Direction 20B Court of Protection Rules 2017.

Among other issues, the appellants will invite the court to clarify:

• The correct approach to the scope of welfare deputyship orders (that is, the areas in which welfare deputies are permitted to make decisions in particular cases) and whether there is anything in law that suggests that the starting point is that the scope of the applications ought to be limited and ought to exclude, for example, decisions relating to residence.
• Whether there is an evidential threshold for the making of such orders, for example, should the applicant(s) be required to establish that collaborative decision making under s.4 of the MCA has been attempted but failed; and
• Whether the making of welfare deputyship orders of this nature represents an “infringement of [P]’s right to autonomy” as found at first instance, taking account of the opposite conclusion reached by Mr Justice Poole in the case of Parr.

According to Rook Irwin Sweeney, a date has not yet been set in the Court of Appeal.

JB and SB are represented by Alex Rook and Katie Sinclair of Rook Irwin Sweeney, and Steve Broach KC and Francesca Gardner of 39 Essex Chambers.

Lottie Winson