Supreme Court declines to hear appeal over refusal by council to allow more than one group to participate in planning committee meeting

At issue in R (on the application of Moakes) v Canterbury City Council and another was the lawfulness of the decision of Canterbury City Council to grant planning permission for a proposed development, including a winery, in the Kent Downs Area of Outstanding National Beauty on 8 September 2023.

The application for planning permission had been made by the managing director of three associated companies known as HICO Group.

The council’s decision was made following a meeting of its planning committee, governed by Appendix I of its constitution.

The local authority considered that its constitution allowed only one group to speak against the proposal. The Kent Downs AONB Unit held this position.

Canterbury thus informed representatives of Natural England and of the Campaign to Protect Rural England – Kent Branch that they could speak against the proposal only in an individual capacity.

Kent Downs AONB Unit represented the views of Natural England. However, CPRE Kent was not represented at the meeting.

The appellant, a member of CPRE Kent, also decided against registering to speak at the meeting, as she believed CPRE Kent would be speaking.

In consequence, only one person spoke against, and four people spoke in favour of, the proposed development.

The appellant challenged the decision on four grounds, including on grounds of procedural unfairness.

The High Court found that the city council breached its constitution and gave misleading advice in allowing the representatives of Natural England and CPRE Kent to speak only in an individual capacity.

It nevertheless considered that the appellant did not suffer material prejudice and, so, rejected the appellant’s challenge on grounds of procedural unfairness.

This was among the grounds unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant applied to the Supreme Court in respect of this issue.

A Supreme Court panel comprising Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Sales and Lord Hamblen refused permission to appeal this month, concluding that the application did not raise an arguable point of law.

See also: Inability to speak at a planning committee meeting and prejudice - Isabella Tafur analyses the Court of Appeal’s ruling, which confirmed that whether prejudice arises from an inability to speak is a question of fact to be reviewed on appeal in accordance with the principles articulated in Smech Properties Ltd v Runnymede Borough Council and Others.