Judge quashes grant of planning permission for extension of holiday park over failure to give adequate reasons

The Planning Court has quashed the grant of planning permission for a multi-million pound extension of a caravan park, following a legal challenge brought by local residents.

Pembrokeshire County Council granted permission in January 2024 for the installation of 48 bases for holiday lodges, a spa facility, holiday apartments in a former inn, café and cycle hire, equestrian stables and other facilities at Heritage Park, Pleasant Valley, Narberth. 

The development would involve a northward extension of an existing caravan park that has 112 static caravan plots.

The council is the freeholder of the existing park, which it leased to the interested party in 2007 on a long lease.

His Honour Judge Jarman KC, who was sitting as a judge of the High Court, said it was not in dispute that the development would conflict with important policies in the local development plan adopted in 2013.

The most relevant policy relating to the extension of caravan sites, GN 19, permits such extensions only within settlement boundaries.

The areas of the proposed development allocated for the holiday lodges are outside the settlement boundary of Stepaside and Pleasant Valley.

The proposed holiday apartments are predominantly within that settlement boundary, but Stepaside is a local village and not a town, service centre or service village as required by policy GN 17, and on that basis the proposed development is also contrary to that policy, the judge noted.

HHJ Jarman KC said: “Such conflict was at the heart of the defendant’s planning officers recommending refusal prior to meetings of the defendant’s planning committee in September and October 2024 and of the full council in November 2024. The planning committee, after a site visit, resolved to grant planning permission, and because this did not follow officer recommendation, the application was referred to the full council.”

Pembrokeshire’s head of planning produced a further report for the council. That recorded that the planning committee in October 2024 resolved to grant planning permission for the proposed development subject to the conditions outlined in the head of planning’s report to the committee, which was against officer recommendation, and that the reason given by the committee was that it considered that greater weight should be afforded to the suggested economic benefits (set out in an economic assessment accompanying the application by the interested party) of the proposal rather than development plan policy.

The head of planning’s report to the full council contained the following recommendation:

“That the Council does not endorse the resolution of the Planning Committee and refuse the planning application for the following reason:-

By reason of the proposed bases for holiday lodges being outside of a settlement and the holiday apartments not being within or well-related to a town, service centre or service village; the proposed development fails to accord with policies SP 1, SP 5, SP 16, GN.1, GN.17 and GN.19 of the Local Development Plan for Pembrokeshire (adopted 28 February 2013).”

No written reasons were formulated before the application was put to the council to vote, HHJ Jarman KC noted.

The resolution to be voted on was expressed to be whether the council should endorse the resolution of the planning committee. The vote was in favour and the resolution recorded as such.

Permission to bring the challenge was granted on two of the seven grounds on which permission was sought. The two grounds were:

• No or no adequate reasons were given by the council for its decision (ground 1), and
• The council dealt with the issue of the economic benefits of the proposed development in a way that was unreasonable and unlawful (ground 3).

On ground 1, counsel for the claimant submitted that the reasoning in Cross v Cornwall Council [2021] EWHC 1323 (Admin) applied to the case.

In his skeleton argument he set out several issues in the head of planning’s report which he submitted the council did not grapple with or give reasons in relation thereto.

He focused on two in particular. The first was the officer’s view that because of the overprovision of static caravans, the economic benefits of the proposed developed would result in disbenefits at other sites. The second was that development in the countryside would be unsustainable and lead to a dangerous precedent.

Counsel for Pembrokeshire submitted that the head of planning accepted that there would be economic benefits of the proposed development, and although uncertainty about those were expressed, there often was uncertainty about such assessments.

The council was entitled to accept the economic benefits set out in the report without having to say what particular weight was attached to such benefits, she argued.

It was also submitted that it was clear from the minutes that the issues of development in the countryside, sustainability and precedent were debated and taken into account. Those did not amount to principal issues in dispute. The only principal issue in dispute was whether the policy issues outweighed the economic benefits, as the officers considered, or it was the other way around, as the council considered. That was a matter of planning judgment, counsel argued.

However, HHJ Jarman KC said: “I have come to the conclusion that on the facts of this case, the reason given by the council did not deal adequately with the important principal issues of development in the countryside, sustainability and precedent. Nor did it deal adequately with the important principal issue of the extent to which detrimental impact on existing sites was or should be taken into account when weighing the economic benefit of the proposed development. The economic assessment of the interested party expressly dealt with the latter, but not the former.”

He added: “It is not apparent why the council came to the conclusion it did. This major departure from countryside and sustainability policies is likely to have a lasting relevance for the question of policy in future cases. The reason does not enable opponents to understand how the policy or approach to the grant of permission may impact upon future applications. It does not enable developers or opponents to know the relevance or importance of any detrimental economic impacts on existing sites. Accordingly, in my judgment each of these failures gives rise to substantial prejudice. This is not helped by the fact that the council’s resolution is simply to endorse the resolution of the planning committee, which predated the fuller report of the head of planning to the council.”

The judge also concluded that ground 3 was made out.

He said: “I accept that the economic assessment concluded that the economic benefits of the proposed development, particularly the investment and the provision of local jobs, would help to support economic prosperity throughout the county and that that was important given changes in the local tourism industry and the need to attract and retain a working age population. I accept that the officers’ reports recognised that, at least to some extent.

"But in my judgment the tenor of the meeting of the council was to focus on the economic benefits of the proposed development but not upon the detriment to existing sites dealt with in the reports. The latter was mentioned in the meeting, but the tenor was very much upon the former. In my judgment that was too narrow an approach.”

The judge rejected a submission on behalf of the council that it was highly likely that notwithstanding any defects in the decision-making process, the outcome for the claimant would not be substantially different. 

He added: “[In] my judgment ground 1 is sufficient on its own to justify the quashing of the council’s decision and to remit the matter to the council for determination. If additional justification for that course is needed, it arises on my finding that ground 3 is also made out.”