High Court upholds order for possession leaving disabled 62-year-old woman homeless

Reading Borough Council has defeated an appeal against eviction by a disabled resident with a long history of anti-social behaviour.

Mr Justice Edwin Johnson ruled in the High Court that the tenant must leave the council flat where she lives.

The appellant had appealed against an order made by HHJ Melissa Clarke in December 2022 granting Reading possession of the flat.

This was suspended pending the appeal outcome. She argued that the judge had been wrong to dismiss her case that Reading breached its public sector equality duty under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 and that its claim for possession constituted discrimination against her contrary to Section 15 of the Equality Act

The court heard that the appellant has a diagnosis of emotionally unstable personality disorder.

She was the tenant of a studio flat on the first floor of a two storey block of sheltered accommodation with a Tunstall system installed by which residents can call for assistance.

From the start of her tenancy the appellant’s behaviour “gave rise to substantial problems for the [council], the other residents in the block, and those involved in the management and provision of services to the block”, the court heard. There was repeated abuse of carers sent by the operator of the call system.

HHJ Melissa Clarke had said the abuses included a large volume of calls, voicemails, texts and abusive conduct to staff and contractors and that the appellant had made “over-55 neighbours, some elderly and vulnerable themselves, who have been assessed as suitable for sheltered housing, feel unsafe and insecure in their homes such that some of them have asked to leave it.

“They and other users of the Tunstall system have been put in danger by the defendant's excessive use of, and damage to the Tunstall system.”

A medical report had concluded that the appellant had a disability within the meaning of Section 6 of the Act, due to her disorder and there was a connection between this and her conduct but “not one which absolved [her] from responsibility for her actions”.

Edwin Johnson J said the appellant contended the judge had been wrong over the effect of eviction upon her, bearing in mind her particular disability, because Reading had breached the public sector equality duty by failing to consider the specific effect an eviction - with consequential homelessness - would have on her. She argued Reading should have sought further expert advice.

“The judge was not able to carry out a consideration of this kind because the appellant had adduced no, or no sufficient evidence which permitted consideration of this question,” Edwin Johnson J said.

He concluded: “I cannot see any basis for interfering with the decision of the judge that the [council] did adequately consider, with the required sharp focus, the effect of eviction upon the appellant in the light of her disability.”

The appellant also argued the judge had been wrong over the question of suitable alternative accommodation because the council did not demonstrate whether it had considered if such accommodation was available in Reading.

But Edwin Johnson J said: “The judge's consideration of the proportionality issue was largely concerned with the argument of the appellant that there had been a failure to consider whether there was suitable alternative accommodation which could be made available to the appellant, which in turn, so it was submitted, rendered the eviction disproportionate.”

He continued: “In my view it is clear from the judgment that the judge did consider this question, with the required sharp focus, and came to a clear conclusion…I can see no basis for interfering with the judge's decision that she did not require this further evidence, it seems to me that the appellant's complaint falls away.”

Describing the case as “most unfortunate”, Edwin Johnson J said no court would - unless unavoidable - wish to make a possession order that would leave a 62-year-old woman with a disability homelessness, but the court had made “very serious findings as to the problems created by the appellant's behaviour, in terms of the risks and dangers to persons and property”.

He said it was “particularly unfortunate that the appellant's behaviour does not appear to have improved since the making of the possession order”.

Mark Smulian