High Court judge refuses application by mother for order prohibiting council from getting child vaccinated

In S v London Borough of Islington & Anor [2025], Mr Justice MacDonald concluded: “There is no basis for concluding that the decision of the local authority to exercise the powers conferred on it by s.33 of the Children Act 1989 by arranging for P to be vaccinated is unreasonable, irrational, or otherwise unlawful or is otherwise in breach of her rights, or those of P, under Art 8 of the ECHR.

“In the circumstances, the decision falls firmly in favour of refusing the mother's application for an order prohibiting the local authority from taking that course of action.”

The case concerned P, aged 8 months old.

P has been subject to an interim care order since early 2025, due to concerns around the mother being unable to meet her four older children's basic care needs, concerns around engagement with school, and poor supervision of the children and their anti-social behaviour.

MacDonald J said: “Within the context of ongoing care proceedings in respect of P, in which she has been made the subject of an interim care order under s.38 of the Children Act 1989, the mother, S, applies for an order under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court preventing the local authority from having P vaccinated, pursuant to the authority conferred on it by s.33 of the 1989 Act.”

The mother's application sought an "Order to prevent the Local Authority from carrying out vaccinations for P."

The mother's objections were summarised by the judge as follows:

i) The mother is concerned regarding links between the vaccinations sought by the local authority and autism.

ii) The mother has concerns about immediate adverse reactions from the vaccinations, which she reports were suffered by her friend's children.

iii) The mother believes non-white children are disproportionately adversely affected.

iv) P is up-to-date with all her health visitor appointments and she is in good communication with P's GP about her health more generally.

v) The mother advises that she is aware that she has the option to seek further advice in relation to immunisations from the GP if required.

The judge said: “I gently pressed the mother on the fact that there are no cogent scientific studies linking childhood vaccination to the development of ASD or ADHD. In response, the mother fell back on her belief that she was entitled to exercise 'my right to decline' and her contended for personal experience of seeing children suffer developmental issues consequent, she believed, on the administration of vaccines.”

The judge noted that the following observations from Re H (A Child) (Parental Responsibility: Vaccination) were “salient” when considering the mother's application in the case:

i) Although vaccinations are not compulsory, the scientific evidence now clearly establishes that it is in the best medical interests of children to be vaccinated in accordance with Public Health England's guidance unless there is a specific contra-indication in an individual case.

ii) Under s.(33)(b) CA 1989 a local authority with a care order can arrange and consent to a child in its care being vaccinated where it is satisfied that it is in the best interests of that individual child, notwithstanding the objections of parents.

iii) The administration of standard or routine vaccinations cannot be regarded as being a ‘serious’ or 'grave' matter. Except where there are significant features which suggest that, unusually, it may not be in the best interests of a child to be vaccinated, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for a local authority to refer the matter to the High Court in every case where a parent opposes the proposed vaccination of their child. To do so involves the expenditure of scarce time and resources by the local authority, the unnecessary instruction of medical evidence and the use of High Court time which could be better spent dealing with one of the urgent and serious matters which are always awaiting determination in the Family Division.

iv) Parental views regarding immunisation must always be taken into account but the matter is not to be determined by the strength of the parental view unless the view has a real bearing on the child's welfare.

Discussing the case, MacDonald J said: “As I have recounted, the local authority currently has an interim care order and must act in P's best interests. Under s. 33 of the 1989 Act, the local authority has the power to determine the extent to which the mother may exercise her parental responsibility, in this instance by deciding to have P vaccinated in order to safeguard or promote her welfare, and has chosen to exercise that power. I am not satisfied that it can be said that that decision on the part of the local authority was unreasonable, irrational, disproportionate or otherwise unlawful or is otherwise in breach of her rights, or those of P, under Article 8 of the ECHR.

“As observed in Re H (A Child) (Parental Responsibility: Vaccination), the current established medical view is that the routine vaccination of infants is in the best interests of those children and for the public good.”

He continued: “The mother has not placed before the court cogent, objective medical and/or welfare evidence demonstrating a genuine contra-indication to the administration of one or all of the routine vaccinations for P. There is no evidence of such conditions or contraindications in the LAC medical review. The views expressed by the mother as to the dangers of vaccination for P derive, I am satisfied, from her own assessment of material she has heard and accessed online.”

The judge acknowledged that the applicant is the mother of P, and that as such she has an Art 8 right to family life with P.

However, he said, “the right to respect to private and family life set out in Art 8(1) is qualified by Art 8(2).”

He continued: “In this context, the court must take account of the fact that the is a pressing social need to vaccinate infant children to achieve the legitimate objectives both of protecting the vaccinated child and of securing the health and safety of the wider population through herd immunity. Whilst the law must allow for exceptions where vaccination is contraindicated on health or welfare grounds, and meet the requirements of foreseeability and accessibility and contain adequate safeguards, these requirements are met by the legal framework established by s. 33(3) of the 1989 Act, which gives the local authority a power, not a duty, to determine the extent to which the mother may exercise her parental responsibility by refusing to have P vaccinated, and the authority will not exercise that power where there is objective evidence to contraindicate it. In the circumstances, the local authority's decision does not constitute an unnecessary or disproportionate interference in the mother's Art 8 right to respect for family life.”

Finally, the judge was not satisfied that it would be appropriate to wait until the conclusion of the proceedings before a decision on the mother's application was made.

He said: “To do so would leave P exposed to the risks attendant on childhood diseases, and would leave her exposed to those diseases at a very young age when she remains vulnerable.”

Concluding the case and dismissing the mother’s application, Mr Justice MacDonald said: “For all these reasons, there is no basis for concluding that the decision of the local authority to exercise the powers conferred on it by s.33 of the Children Act 1989 by arranging for P to be vaccinated is unreasonable, irrational, or otherwise unlawful or is otherwise in breach of her rights, or those of P, under Art 8 of the ECHR. In the circumstances, the decision falls firmly in favour of refusing the mother's application for an order prohibiting the local authority from taking that course of action.”

Lottie Winson