Court of Appeal judge quashes extempore ruling in child injuries case for insufficient reasoning

A Family Court judge gave inadequate reasons for her conclusions when giving an extempore judgment in a case concerning injuries to a child, the Court of Appeal has ruled.

A fresh hearing must now be held before a designated family judge.

HHJ Mellanby heard a case at the Watford Family Court concerning Child S. The child’s mother appealed on the grounds that the judgment was unclear.

In S (A Child: Adequacy of Reasoning), Re [2019] EWCA Civ 1845 Peter Jackson LJ, with whom Lord Justice Davis and Lady Justice Aplin agreed, allowed the appeal, noting the case was “a reminder of the pressure under which judges of the family court are working”.

HHJ Mellanby conducted a fact finding hearing in care proceedings hearing 10 witnesses over three days and, anxious to give the parties a decision, gave an oral judgment lasting two and a quarter hours on the last day.

Peter Jackson LJ said: “We do not overlook the reality. Judges are encouraged to give extempore judgments where possible and appeals will not succeed simply because matters might be better expressed with the luxury of extra hours of preparation or because judgments may contain imperfections.

“What matters is that the parties know the outcome and the reasons for it. Where the essential evidence has been considered and the decision has been adequately justified, that will do.

“In this case however, it did not happen. Despite the judge's efforts, the parties were at the end of the judgment unsure what she had decided about the two main issues in the case.”

S was three years old and arrived at nursery with a broken arm, a mark to his neck and a bruise to his clavicle sustained while in the care of his mother and her partner Mr C.

HHJ Mellaby should, appeal judges said, have sought to answer whether Hertfordshire County Council had proved that the injuries were inflicted as opposed to being accidental and whether one perpetrator could be identified on the balance of probabilities.

The judgment though so lacked clarity that the mother wanted to know whether the court had concluded that the injuries were non-accidental on the balance of probabilities, whether it identified the perpetrator, what evidence had been accepted from doctors and from Mr C.

She also argued it had been perverse for the judge not to take into account “a mass of evidence that compellingly pointed to a finding on the balance of probabilities that the injuries had been caused by Mr C”.

Peter Jackson LJ said: “In my view the main problem with this decision is not so much that it is internally inconsistent as that it has not been sufficiently reasoned.”

He said there had been “no attempt by the judge to reason why there had not been an accident: she simply asserts it”.

There should have been “an analysis of the factors that pointed towards and away from each adult as being the perpetrator. If the result was an inability to identify, so be it, but the attempt had to be made”.

Peter Jackson LJ said there were “undoubtedly inconsistencies in the oral judgment, but one main ground for concern is that the parties had to seek clarification on such fundamental issues at all”.

One example he gave was that a clear statement that Mr C was hiding what he knew had happened from the mother “is not compatible with the conclusion that she may have caused the injury.

“If the judgment as a whole was soundly reasoned this might not be fatal but as matters stand it is a serious anomaly.”

He said: “Imprecision of language pervades the judgement and causes doubt as to what standard of proof the judge was actually applying”.

Mark Smulian