Court tells council to review decision over whether individual was intentionally homeless after being evicted following misrepresentations to obtain tenancy

A County Court judge has confessed to both “significant” and “considerable” hesitation in deciding a case involving whether a person can be deemed intentionally homeless when they have obtained a tenancy following misrepresentations to a local housing authority, which then evicts them as a result.

The case between the appellant and City of Wolverhampton Council came before His Honour Judge Grimshaw,who ultimately concluded he was bound by authorities.

The appeal was brought under s. 204 Housing Act 1996 against the statutory review decision made by Wolverhampton which found the appellant intentionally homeless.

HHJ Grimshaw allowed both sides to introduce new evidence and said he had to decide whether the appellant was intentionally homeless and whether the review decision was flawed by either failing to give appropriate consideration to whether she could legally be intentionally homeless and/or by failing to give adequate reasons.

The appellant was born in Zimbabwe and arrived in the UK in 2001 aged 21. Her household consists of herself and three children. She alleges that she is the victim of serious domestic abuse.

She gained a secure tenancy from Birmingham City Council in January 2011, but in January 2020, applied to Wolverhampton as homeless having been asked to leave her partner's property in Wolverhampton as it was too small.

Her application included a five-year address history which did not refer to the Birmingham flat, and she said that she had never been a council tenant.

Wolverhampton granted her tenancy but a year later became aware she was holding two council tenancies and served a possession notice on the basis of a tenancy obtained by false statement.

The appellant denied she had failed to disclose her Birmingham tenancy and denied that her statement on not being a council tenant was false.  She said she had left the Birmingham flat due to domestic violence.

She claimed she had not knowingly misstated her position, had not committed fraud, and was genuinely homeless because she had nowhere else to live.

After reviews Wolverhampton stuck to its position that it had been deceived into allocating a tenancy to someone who was intentionally homeless.

HHJ Grimshaw said having heard the evidence “not without significant hesitation given the forceful and persuasive submissions made by [Wolverhampton] regarding the policy implications for the respondent and other local housing authorities faced with an applicant who has deceived them to obtain accommodation to which they were not entitled but yet, when found out, are treated not to be 'intentionally homeless', I am bound by the decisions in Chishimba and Gliddon and must follow them.”

The judge found the appellant could properly argue that, on the basis of the factual findings reached by Wolverhampton and not challenged on appeal, the Wolverhampton property was not reasonable for her to continue to occupy.

HHJ Grimshaw explained: “I therefore find that the property was not reasonable for the appellant to continue to occupy on the basis that she was not entitled to a tenancy of the property in the first place and was only granted a tenancy by the respondent as a result of her deception.”

He added that with “considerable hesitation…I allow the appellant's appeal in that the respondent misdirected itself in law as to whether it was reasonable for her to continue to occupy the property in light of the findings made within the review decision and thus by finding that she was intentionally homeless.

“Insofar as the respondent did take this into account, it provided inadequate reasons to justify the conclusion reached and, in those circumstances, Ground 3 of the appellant's appeal is allowed.”

The judge said he was not satisfied that Wolverhampton would have inevitably reached the same conclusions had it considered and analysed the legal position more fully and said it should review its decision further in light of the matters raised in this appeal including the circumstances in which the appellant ceased to occupy the Birmingham flat.

Mark Smulian