How to approach sovereign citizens and a freeman-on-the-land

May 12, 2023

Yisroel Greenberg gives an introduction to sovereign citizens and freeman-on-the-land and considers how local authorities can respond to their arguments.

A number of people adhere to the mistaken belief that they can be exempt from all sorts of obligations because they have learnt how to claim some magical status. Local authorities impose and enforce a number of inconvenient obligations on their residents, and consequently see more than their fair share of such beliefs. However, not all local authority lawyers are familiar with these schemes and their wider context, which can make it harder to respond proportionately and effectively. This article aims to provide that context and offers some practical suggestions for responding.

Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments

There is no single name for the schemes in question. The reason for this is that despite the commonalities between the versions, they are not a single movement, or even many movements, but a collection of unaffiliated, loosely-overlapping ones.

The most common variants found in the UK are known as sovereign citizens and freeman-on-the-land. However, this article will use a term coined by Associate Chief Justice Rooke sitting in the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, Canada, in the landmark case of Meads v. Meads, 2021 ABQB 571: Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (“OPCA”) schemes.

Organised reflects the fact that people do not come to these theories by themselves, but learn them from self-styled “gurus” who teach and preach these. Pseudolegal reflects the fact that these arguments are designed to appear to be based in law, but are in fact meaningless. Commercial reflects the fact that these gurus frequently charge for their lessons – or to update Meads, may monetise their social media accounts.

Spotting OPCA schemes

Giving a complete list of OPCA schemes would be impossible. However, there are many red flags which suggest that someone has been influenced by OPCA schemes. Meads provides an excellent summary at section V of the judgment, which this article is too short to reproduce, but some key indicators, loosely grouped into categories, is as follows:

Formatting & punctuation: Unusual formatting of names, such as “:gary-winston :of the family lineker”. Documents “sealed” with a thumbprint in red ink. Postage stamps placed on documents as if to “authenticate” them.

Inapplicable law & authorities: Reference to any of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”, which is US federal legislation), Black’s Law Dictionary, Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights. Repeated pseudolegal “mantras” (common examples include “Notice to agent is notice to principal, notice to principal is notice to agent”, “All rights reserved, non-assumpsit”).

Consent: Demanding evidence that the person has consented to be bound by some piece of legislation or (for example) pay Council Tax. Serving an “affidavit” and asserting that if the recipient fails to rebut the contents within a set time limit, they are forever deemed to be true.

“Straw man” theory: Distinguishing between ones’ “real” and “legal” persons. Writing to staff in their personal capacities (e.g. “Ms So-and-so, doing business as Chief Executive of Such-and-such Council”). Addressing public bodies as if they were limited companies.

Money: Charging for any interaction (an excellent example can be found at Appendix A of Meads) and using a “common law commercial lien” to enforce this. Demanding a VAT invoice for e.g. parking tickets, or demanding these comply with the Bills of Exchange Act 1882.

Courts & court behaviour: Referring to alternative “common law courts” or “world courts”. Requesting a judge present evidence of their oath or “bond information”, or demanding they answer various questions to prove their suitability to sit. Refusing to sit or otherwise behaving disruptively in court hearings.

These arguments are meaningless

If any of the flags mentioned above seem incomprehensible, this is because they are ultimately meaningless nonsense. Lawyers who are used to having to decipher badly-drafted documents from litigants in person may fall into the trap of trying – but failing – to decipher OPCA materials. This is a mistake. Understanding the fundamental emptiness of these arguments is critical to responding proportionately.

The point is made emphatically in Meads:

[77] The bluntly idiotic substance of Mr. Meads’ argument explains the unnecessarily complicated manner in which it was presented. OPCA arguments are never sold to their customers as simple ideas, but instead are byzantine schemes which more closely resemble the plot of a dark fantasy novel than anything else. Latin maxims and powerful sounding language are often used. Documents are often ornamented with many strange marking and seals. Litigants engage in peculiar, ritual‑like in court conduct. All these features appear necessary for gurus to market OPCA schemes to their often desperate, ill‑informed, mentally disturbed, or legally abusive customers. This is crucial to understand the non-substance of any OPCA concept or strategy. The story and process of a OPCA scheme is not intended to impress or convince the Courts, but rather to impress the guru’s customer. (Emphasis in original)

Meads explains the underlying “rationale” (to the extent there is one) behind the core arguments, and rebuts them in exhaustive detail, with the explicit purpose of providing authority to save time for future courts. It has been cited worldwide for this purpose, including in the UK (see e.g. CH v SSWP (JSA) (No. 2) [2018] UKUT 320 (AAC) in England; Watson v Lord Advocate (Sheriff Court of Glasgow and Strathkelvin, 2013) (unreported, but see Westlaw UK at [2013] 5 WLUK 590) in Scotland; and Ulster Bank Limited v Dace Properties Limited [2017] NICh 10 in Northern Ireland).

OPCA schemes in the UK

OPCA schemes, and local variations of them, flourish in many jurisdictions around the world. In the UK, it appears to have been particularly imported around the early 2010s, with some links to the Occupy London movement. It became more prominent when these schemes were deployed to challenge lockdown restrictions during the pandemic, and developed links with the anti-vaccination movement.

I am not aware of any cases at a high level in the UK engaging with the phenomenon. However, there are some which bear traces of OPCA schemes. In June 2019, Local Government Lawyer reported on the case of T (A child), Re [2019] EWHC 1572 (Fam). It is plain that the father who opposed registering their child’s birth for “fundamental philosophical” reasons was in fact basing himself on OPCA arguments. London Borough of Lambeth v Grant & Ors [2021] EWHC 1962 (QB) likewise appears to reflect OPCA submissions by some of the protestors.

Anecdotally, there is other evidence of the wider deployment of these schemes. For example, a number of local authorities have dedicated webpages responding to these arguments in the context of council tax (for illustration, see e.g. Bradford, Vale of White Horse, Stroud, and Barnet). This site has also reported on unsuccessful attempts by defendants to use OPCA ideas to defend local authority prosecutions. I recall a query on a professional network I am part of by a lawyer at another authority who was confused by a number of residents claiming immunity from PCNs on the basis of fictional diplomatic status (arising from their supposed “sovereignty”), stating they had “registered allodial title” to their vehicles. In February 2023, HMCTS took the unusual step of publishing a news story warning about fake, “common law” car insurance, which appears to be a new OPCA scheme.

The most frequent context I have personally dealt with OPCA schemes in is people challenging Penalty Charge Notices. In one instance, a person who used these schemes to charge “fees” and impose a “commercial lien” on members of staff issued County Court proceedings to “enforce” this. Recently, my employer received a series of emails, from what appears to be a group of people who have all attended some kind of talk or seminar, each taking it in turns to “give notice” of an alternative “world constitution”.

In short, this is undoubtedly a phenomenon with practical relevance for local government lawyers.

Practical tips for dealing with OPCA litigants

There is no single approach suitable for all people deploying OPCA arguments. Much depends on the individual, and whether they are intensely committed to their worldview or simply trying something found on the internet.

For the latter, my experience has been that one or two letters, firmly explaining that the arguments being deployed are meaningless and suggesting the person take legal advice, generally sees an end to the matter.

However, it is worth taking some care to check whether the OPCA material may be obscuring legitimate queries. For example, I have seen letters containing some requests which are frivolous – such as for evidence that the writer had consented to our issuing Penalty Charge Notices – but also some which are legitimate subject access requests under the GDPR. In such cases, it would be prudent to respond in the usual way to the legitimate requests. Lambeth v Grant is another useful illustration: Some of the protestors made “normal”, non-OPCA submissions, and the court duly considered these.

For committed OPCA believers, this approach may be insufficient. The types of difficulties which could arise may include:

Targeting of staff in their personal capacities, especially purporting to make staff personally liable for “compensation”. It is very likely that this would amount to harassment within the meaning of section 1(1) or (1A) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, and authorities can take both criminal and civil proceedings to protect staff.
Disruption of court proceedings, e.g. refusing to sit, interrupting, having members of the public who are similarly disruptive attend etc. Authorities can mitigate this by ensuring the court is aware of the context above and factoring in the possibility of disruption to directions & case management. Depending on the proceedings in question, there may be scope to exclude members of the public who are disruptive or even proceed in the absence of the OPCA litigant.
The issuing of vexatious proceedings & applications. Authorities should take, and invite the court to take, a robust approach to these, including seeking a civil restraint order as appropriate. (Courts in Canada have held that OPCA schemes are so self-evidently flawed that it can be presumed that a litigant deploying them is doing so in bad faith, justifying an award of indemnity costs against them, and it would be interesting to see whether the UK courts would adopt a similar approach.)

As empty as OPCA schemes are, there is no doubt as to their potential for disruption and cost to authorities dealing with OPCA litigants. There are pockets of knowledge of this phenomenon in the UK, but it does not yet have a sufficiently widespread exposure across local government and many lawyers would benefit from this. Hopefully, the above goes some way to assisting people discovering this for the first time.

Yisroel Greenberg is a lawyer at Ealing Council. He would like to thank colleagues for their encouragement and for comments on an early draft.