Judge allows appeal against decisions of city council over whether accommodation was unsuitable

A homelessness appeal has been allowed on three out of four grounds on behalf of a man who was placed in unsuitable accommodation by Cambridge City Council.

In Querino v Cambridge City Council, Judge Moloney found failure by the council to provide a “minded to” letter, a breach of the section 193 Housing Act 1996 and a failure to consider “key document arguments”.

Outlining the background to the case, Duncan Lewis Solicitors, the law firm representing the claimant said he had approached Cambridge in or around January 2022 for housing assistance.

Following inquiries into his application, the council accepted the main housing duty to him in July 2022.

In September 2022, the council made the man a final offer of accommodation, which was a Part VI social housing offer.

The man accepted the offer and moved in.

Duncan Lewis said that with the assistance from its housing team, the claimante requested a review of the suitability on the basis that there was “insufficient space at the property to enable his three daughters to reside overnight, with whom he will have shared access to”.

The law firm said it had argued the client’s case by submitting “detailed representations on review explaining why the client considers the accommodation unsuitable for his needs”.

In November 2022, the council’s reviewing officer issued a decision concluding that the property was suitable for the client. The decision gave rise to a statutory appeal on a point of law, Duncan Lewis said.

At the hearing at Cambridge County Court on 29 March 2022 in front of Judge Moloney, counsel raised four grounds of appeal:

1. The review was carried out in breach of Regulation 7(2) of the Homelessness (Review Procedure, etc.) Regulations 2018 SI No. 223 as the reviews officer did not send a "minded to" letter. The officer reached a decision without taking into account relevant information including a CAFCASS report, which strongly supported the man’s review.
2. The council’s offer was in breach of section 193(7F)(a) as the council could not be satisfied that the man could end his existing contractual obligations in relation to his temporary accommodation provided by the council before being required to take up the Part VI offer. The council had no information before them to state when he could terminate his temporary accommodation and when the tenancy will commence, as the offer letter did not state a start date for the tenancy.
3. The council wrongly excluded fundamental supporting documentation i.e. the CAFCASS report. The council failed to notify the client of their reasons for not considering the supporting documentation. Had they notified him of their minded to decision, the client could have taken necessary steps to obtain any consent required.
4. The reviews officer failed to apply the correct legal test when considering the suitability of the property. Counsel raised that section 176 HA ’96 states that accommodation shall only be regarded as available for a person's occupation if it is available for occupation by him together with any other person who might reasonably be expected to reside with him at the accommodation. The test is therefore “reasonably be expected to reside” however, the council applied a much higher test of "exceptional circumstances" from their internal policy.

Responding to the grounds submitted, counsel for Cambridge argued that the decision on review was lawful as there was “no deficiency or irregularity as all issues were dealt with within the decision letter”.

Secondly, it was argued by the council that when the man moves into the new property, he is “no longer liable by the licence agreement, instead by the secure tenancy he accepted”.

It was noted by counsel that the licence does not continue and he was able to hand back the keys to the temporary accommodation any time, which is what he did.

According to Duncan Lewis, on Ground 3, counsel reiterated that the issues of suitability were dealt with within the review decision. Finally it was argued that, in relation to Ground 4, it was “not reasonable for the client’s daughters to reside with him as they had accommodation elsewhere”.

Considering submissions from both parties, Judge Moloney confirmed that the reviews officer “erred on a point of law” in relation to Ground 1.

On Ground 2, Judge Moloney found that the burden of proof was on the local authority that the offer complied with statutory requirements. The local authority “remains under an obligation to house an applicant”.

Thirdly, he found that the local authority was wrong to exclude the CAFCASS report without applying to the Court, Duncan Lewis said. The judge said that the reviews officer made a “serious error in law” and the appeal was allowed on Ground 3.

Jude Moloney allowed the appeal on Grounds 1, 2 and 3. However Ground 4 was not upheld.

Lottie Winson