Divisional Court rejects legal challenge over introduction to Senedd of Bill that would ban greyhound racing in Wales

The claim followed the Deputy First Minister of Wales telling the Senedd in February 2025 that “now is the right time to move to ban greyhound racing in Wales”.

Lord Justice Lewis and Mr Justice Chamberlain were asked to consider (i) a claim for judicial review of the Deputy First Minister’s statement of 18 February 2025; and (ii) an application to amend the claim to challenge the subsequent decision to introduce the Bill into the Senedd.

“The sole ground of challenge is that each of these was unlawful because the Welsh Ministers failed to carry out a public consultation before deciding to ban greyhound racing in Wales. This, it is said, was in breach of the claimant’s legitimate expectation arising from statements made by the Welsh Ministers that they would consult before making any changes to policy in relation to greyhound racing.”

The Greyhound Board of Great Britain sought declarations that:

“a. There was an unlawful failure by the Defendants to consult on the proposal to ban greyhound racing in Wales;

b. The Defendants’ decision to ban greyhound racing in Wales was unlawful;

c. The exercise of the statutory function by the Deputy First Minister in his capacity as a Welsh Minister pursuant to section 110(1)(a) of the Government of Wales Act 2006 (GoWA) was based on that unlawful decision and is consequently unlawful;

d. The Defendants are expected to seek the permission of the Senedd to withdraw the Bill pursuant to Senedd Standing Order 26.79; and

e. The Senedd is expected to permit withdrawal of the Bill.”

In R (Greyhound Board of Great Britain Ltd) v Welsh Ministers [2026] EWHC 670 (Admin) Lord Justice Lewis and Mr Justice Chamberlain dismissed the claim.

They found that in areas falling within its legislative competence, the Senedd has plenary legislative powers. One consequence of this, reflected in s. 107 of GoWA, is that the Senedd is, in general, the sole arbiter of the procedure to be adopted in enacting legislation.

“Leaving aside the case where it is said that a statutory procedural rule has been breached, it would not be appropriate for the courts to consider a complaint that (for example) a committee acted unfairly in taking or failing to take evidence from persons who might be affected by a Bill, that too little time had been given for opponents of the Bill to make their points or that some procedural requirement of the standing orders had been wrongly waived,” the Divisional Court said.

“This is not only because a court would be ill-equipped to adjudicate complaints of this kind (which are likely to have a political dimension), but also because doing so would trespass on to the territory of a legislature with plenary powers, contrary to the constitutional separation of powers.”

Lord Justice Lewis and Mr Justice Chamberlain said that the introduction of a Bill into the Senedd “sets in train a procedure which shares the aim, though not the methods, of a consultation process governing administrative decision-making: i.e. to allow for consideration to be given to the competing views and interests of those affected by the proposal”.

They added: “The Senedd is in charge of the process. It is for the Senedd to decide, in accordance with its standing orders, what evidence will be sought and from whom and for how long and in what form the proposed legislation will be debated. It would be inconsistent with this procedural aspect of the Senedd’s plenary powers, and contrary to the principle of the separation of powers, if the courts could review the initiating act of Senedd proceedings on the ground that some prior process of consultation should have been completed before the legislation was introduced.”

A second consequence, they added, is that, once the Bill becomes an Act, any invalidity in the introduction of the Bill will be an “invalidity in the Senedd proceedings leading to its enactment” within s. 107 of GoWA and, therefore, incapable of affecting the validity of the Act.

“Against that background, it would be anomalous if the court could, on the basis of the same invalidity, grant relief affecting the validity of the Bill before its enactment,” the Divisional Court said.

More generally, ss. 111B and 112 of GoWA create a procedure by which a challenge to a Bill can be brought on particular grounds by particular individuals before the Supreme Court at a particular time, Lord Justice Lewis and Mr Justice Chamberlain said.

“It would be inconsistent with the scheme of the Act if, notwithstanding the carefully drafted parameters of this procedure, it were possible for a wider range of individuals to bring challenges affecting the validity of a Bill on a wider range of grounds (including procedural ones) before a first instance court, before or after the time period set out in GoWA.”

The Divisional Court concluded that the Welsh Ministers had “no legal obligation to consult the public, or any section of the public, before the Bill was introduced into in the Senedd on 29 September 2025. Insofar as it seeks to challenge that decision, the claim therefore fails.”

Lord Justice Lewis and Mr Justice Chamberlain also decided that there were two reasons why it would be inappropriate for them to determine the claim, as originally drafted, challenging the Deputy First Minister’s statement.

“The first is that, in light of our rejection of the challenge to the decision to introduce the Bill, the challenge to the earlier statement is academic. Even if, as the claimant submits, the Welsh Ministers breached the claimant’s legitimate expectation at the pre-legislative stage, that is now water under the bridge if, as we have concluded, the Bill was lawfully introduced.”

They added: “The reality is that the Bill has now completed its legislative stages (including a committee stage in which evidence was taken from a representative of the claimant) and the Welsh Ministers have no power to withdraw it. In those circumstances, a decision that there was a procedural flaw at an earlier stage could not affect the validity of the Bill, or (once Royal Assent is given) the Act, and could not affect the rights of the claimant or anyone else in any way.”

The second reason was that, given that the Bill is now validly before the Senedd—and especially in circumstances where it has completed its legislative stages—the determination of a claim alleging a procedural flaw at the pre-legislative stage “would, in our judgment, be an impermissible interference with the proceedings of the Senedd and contrary to the constitutional separation of powers”.

The Divisional Court said: “The adequacy or otherwise of the process by which the Welsh Ministers consulted on, or otherwise gathered evidence relevant to, the Bill was itself a matter on which views in the Senedd will have differed. As we have indicated, the Senedd has its own processes for resolving differences on questions such as these. Those processes are now complete. It would be wrong for the court to insert itself into that debate at this stage.”