Court quashes council decision on home to school travel package

The High Court has allowed an appeal brought by a single mother in relation to her son’s package of home-to-school transport, finding that a city council’s decision to withdraw the support was “irrational”.

HHJ Richard Williams found the local authority failed to consider whether, in the circumstances, it was reasonable to expect the mother, who was a sole earner, to give up work to accompany her son with significant support needs to school.

The case concerned TYC, born in 2007, who has an Education, Health and Care Plan (EHCP) maintained by the council.

TYC attends a special school for pupils with autism. He needs support with mobility due to his physical health needs, and uses a wheelchair to support his access to activities which require walking in excess of a short distance or short period.

From 2018, TYC was transported to school by minibus with an escort – funded by the council.

In 2023, TYC turned 16 and was no longer of compulsory school age. The council decided to withdraw the package of home-to-school support for the academic year 2023/2024.

That decision was successfully appealed and, in August 2023, the council reinstated the package of home-to-school support for the academic year 2023/2024 since it was satisfied that there were "exceptional circumstances that would justify departing from the general policy."

In March 2024, TYC’s mother, KVD, applied for a continuation of the package of home-to-school support for the academic year 2024/2025.

In June 2024, TYC was awarded a bus pass for the academic year 2024/2025. KVD appealed.

The first appeal was unsuccessful. On the second appeal, (the decision subject to challenge), the council decided: "Your Stage 2 Appeal for Discretionary Travel Assistance has been upheld, and the Panel have decided that [TYC] can be offered a cash equivalent of a travel pass to the value of £315. Please note that this exceeds the value of the Council's 'standard' Personal Travel Budget."

Outlining the submissions of the parties, the judge said: “It is argued on behalf of TYC that the Decision is irrational as the Defendant failed carefully to assess TYC's needs or grapple with the practicalities of requiring his mother to take him to school. In short:

1. KVD is a single parent and is the sole breadwinner for the family. Her ordinary shift schedule means that she cannot take TYC to school every day if she is working;
2. KVD has no support network and would need to give up her job to take TYC to school every day. That would have a significant impact on the family's financial situation and TYC's wellbeing;
3. It is unclear what the Defendant expects KVD to do. Plainly she cannot give up or change her job as this would have a significant impact on the family's financial situation and TYC's wellbeing;
4. The Defendant erred in proceeding upon the basis that it would be feasible for KVD to change her working patterns. The Defendant's failure to interrogate that assumption means that there was not the "careful and sensitive" evidence-based consideration that is required for a rational assessment of a young person's home-to-school-transport needs; and
5. The Defendant baldly asserts that TYC's application was "properly considered". […] The disclosed minutes do not record any consideration of whether TYC's situation is one in which the "normal" expectation that his mother should transport TYC is displaced. The Decision cannot be rational if the relevant assessment was not completed.”

In response, it was submitted on behalf of the council that:

1. Unlike for children of compulsory school age, the relevant statutory provisions do not confer any entitlement to school transport on children of TYC's age;
2. Both case law and statutory guidance make clear that it is reasonable to expect parents to accompany their children to their place of education;
3. Statutory guidance also makes clear that parental work commitments are not considered a sufficiently good reason to displace that expectation.

Analysing the claim, HHJ Richard Williams, sitting as a judge of the High Court, said: “The Defendant's transport policy for sixth-form age children was, in summary, that: i) such children will not, absent exceptional circumstances, be awarded discretionary travel assistance; and ii) a parent's working pattern will not normally be considered a good reason for a parent being unable to accompany their child to school.

“The Defendant's policy in this regard is not subject to challenge, and nor could it be in circumstances where there is i) no absolute obligation on a local authority to provide transport for sixth form age children even for children with disabilities or special educational needs; ii) budgetary constraints are a relevant consideration; iii) parents may have to do more when their children attain age 16; iv) the general expectation is that the parent will accompany their child or make other suitable arrangements for the child's journey to and from school; and v) a parent's working pattern on its own will not amount to exceptional circumstances justifying the award of travel support on a discretionary basis.”

However, the judge observed that local authorities “must act reasonably” in the performance of their functions, noting: “They should not have a blanket policy of never providing discretionary travel and must properly consider and engage with the reasons given by a parent as to why they consider that their child's particular circumstances are exceptional and justify an award of travel support to school.”

HHJ Richard Williams continued: “[In her stage 2 appeal], KVD was not saying that she would have to change her working pattern to accompany TYC to school but rather she would have to give up her job altogether because she was a single parent with no family support.

“The Defendant failed properly to consider/engage with those particular reasons when it stated:

"You indicated that the journey to and from college caused difficulty with your working hours. Although the statutory guidance was not directly applicable to [TYC's] Sixth form application, the panel […] noted that the guidance stated that working patterns will not normally be considered good reasons for a parent being unable to accompany their child."

“The Defendant failed to consider whether, in the particular circumstances, it was reasonable to expect KVD, who was a single parent/sole earner, to give up work to accompany TYC to school. By disregarding this material fact, it rendered the Decision irrational.”

The judge further observed that that in her application and appeals for the previous academic year, KVD had also stated that she was unable to take TYC to school, or make arrangements for others to do so, because she was a single working parent with no support network.

He said: “Ultimately, the Defendant accepted that there were exceptional circumstances, which justified a departure from the general policy, and awarded a package of home-to-school support at least for that academic year. It is difficult to rationalise how, only some 12 months later, the Defendant had formed the view that there were no longer such exceptional circumstances and when faced with the same facts. For these reasons, I consider that the Decision was irrational.”

Under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 198, the court is bound to refuse the grant of relief if it appears to the court “highly likely” that the outcome would not have been “substantially different” if the conduct had not occurred.

It was argued on behalf of the council that, even if there was “some deficiency” in its decision-making process, it was highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different and therefore the relief must be refused.

HHJ Richard Williams rejected this argument, outlining evidence that KVD had changed her working pattern to work weekends in order to be able to accompany TYC to school during at least part of the week, and that TYC's attendance rate had “sharply declined” during the time period that home to school transport was not provided.

The judge quashed the council’s decision and ordered it to reassess the claimant's home-to-school travel package.

Lottie Winson