Mainstream means the school, not the experience

In AA v London Borough of Hounslow [2025] UKUT 226 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal considered how the “mainstream” duty in section 33 Children and Families Act 2014 applies when naming a school in Section I of an EHCP. (para 1)

The parent sought an “ordinary” maintained mainstream primary school (School O). The local authority instead named a maintained mainstream primary school with an autism resource base (School S). (paras 1, 4)

On appeal, the parent argued that mainstream education should mean a “mainstream experience”, rather than education mainly delivered within a specialist resource base. (paras 35, 40)

In a judgment given by Upper Tribunal Judge Stout, the appeal was dismissed. (paras 49–50)

Upper Tribunal Judge Stout explained that section 33 is about the type of institution named. It does not guarantee a particular classroom setting or educational model within that school, and it is not a freestanding right to a “mainstream experience”. (paras 16–18, 42)

A school may still be mainstream for statutory purposes even if it includes specialist provision, provided it is not, as a whole, organised for pupils with SEN. (para 34)

On the facts, the resource base at School S formed part of the mainstream school, with opportunities for integration and progression. (para 37)

The judgment also clarifies that section 33 does not give parents a separate route to insist on a particular mainstream school. Parental preference is addressed through section 39, subject to the section 39(4) exceptions. (para 42)

The “reasonable steps” duty in section 33(4) was not engaged here, because the local authority was not relying on the “efficient education of others” exception in section 33(2)(b). (para 42)

Finally, Upper Tribunal Judge Stout held that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law by failing to address section 9 Education Act 1996 (the duty to have regard to parental wishes, so far as compatible with efficient instruction and training and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure) when deciding what was “appropriate” under section 39(5). (para 43)

That error was not material on the facts, because it could not realistically have affected the outcome. (paras 49–50)

Sean Kennedy and Mandy Aulak are Directors and Co-Founders at Talem Law.

Neutral summary for information only; not legal advice.