Failure to serve child’s permanence reports was serious procedural irregularity, but had no impact on outcome: Court of Appeal
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The Court of Appeal has rejected linked appeals raising a procedural point about the use of child’s permanence reports in adoption proceedings.
In T and F (Placement Orders: Child's Permanence Reports) [2026] EWCA Civ 902 (16 July 2026), Lord Justice Baker, with whom Lady Justice Falk and Lord Justice Miles agreed, found that although the failure to serve the child's permanence reports was a “serious procedural irregularity”, it had “no impact on the outcome of the proceedings”.
The parents of two children, a boy (T), aged rising 4, and a girl (F), aged 2, appealed against care and placement orders made at the conclusion of care proceedings concerning the children.
The procedural point under consideration was the use of what are known as child's permanence reports in adoption proceedings.
The judgment under appeal was delivered ex tempore at the end of the second day of the hearing in December 2025.
The judge found the threshold criteria proved on the basis claimed by the local authority and, after considering the evidence and analysing the advantages and disadvantages of the options for future care, concluded that "adoption is a necessary and proportionate interference in this family's Article 8 rights. In short, that nothing else will do to secure the safety and wellbeing of these children and give them the security and stability they need."
She made care orders in respect of each child, approved the local authority's plans and, after concluding that their welfare required her to dispense with the parents' consent, made the placement orders.
In January 2026, the mother filed a notice of appeal against the care and placement orders. The following month, the father filed a separate notice of appeal against the orders.
Both appeal notices were filed some weeks out of time.
Baker LJ noted: “At that stage, each parent was acting in person and the grounds of appeal were set out in a series of documents. Each contended that the judge's decision was wrong, that the hearing had not been conducted fairly, and that there were deficiencies in the evidence and in the judge's reasoning.
“In addition, each drew attention to the fact that the child's permanence reports had been filed with the court but not served on them or their solicitors and asserted that this amounted to a serious procedural irregularity. Copies of the two reports, which by this stage had been disclosed to the parents, were included in the papers filed with the appeal notices.”
Baker LJ granted the parents leave to appeal out of time and granted permission to appeal on one ground only, that the failure to serve the child's permanence reports relating to the two children on the parents prior to the making of the placement order was a “serious procedural irregularity”.
Discussing the case, Baker LJ said: “As Sir Ernest Ryder observed, a failure to serve a child's permanence report is 'poor practice'. In the present case, that error was compounded by the local authority's failure to comply with a specific direction from the court, a failure which is made all the more surprising by the fact that the direction was made on no fewer than three occasions in the course of the proceedings.
“The equally surprising fact that the omission was not picked up by the parents' legal representatives does not excuse or cancel out the error. On any view it was a procedural irregularity and in my view it was a serious one.”
He continued: “The crucial question, however, is whether, as a result of this irregularity, the decision to make placement orders was unjust. It is only in those circumstances that an appeal against a decision that is not otherwise wrong can be allowed: CPR rule 52.21(3).”
Baker LJ observed that if the court had based its decision to make placement orders on information that was in the child's permanence reports that was not found elsewhere in the papers before the court to which all parties had access, he would have concluded that the decision was unjust.
In this case, however, that is not what happened.
He said: “When questioned by the Court, [counsel for the First Appellant] was unable to point to any information in the child's permanence reports that was material to the decision to make the placement order that was not also found in the statements and other reports before the court. She drew attention to a reference in the reports to the local authority's rejection of the proposal that the children be placed with a paternal aunt.
“[Counsel for the First Appellant] told us that after the placement orders were made the local authority had agreed to assess the aunt. But that subsequent development has no impact on the validity of the placement orders. The child's permanence reports are very lengthy documents and plainly contain more detail about some aspects of the family history, as well as a great deal of repetition. But the key information which the court had to consider when deciding whether to make placement orders was in the statements in the court bundle.”
He added: “There was nothing in the child's permanence reports that could have had a bearing on the judge's decision that was not in the statements. Unlike Re S-F, the evidence on which the judge was asked to make the decision was not 'limited'. On the contrary, it was fully in line with the information which this Court had previously highlighted as being relevant to a placement order decision and the judgment complied with the requirement which this Court has also highlighted for the court's reasoning when making the decision to be related to the evidence.”
Baker LJ concluded that although the failure to serve the child's permanence reports was a serious procedural irregularity, it had no impact on the outcome of the proceedings.
He continued: “I do not accept the submission that, because of the life-changing significance of adoption, such a failure automatically renders the decision to make a placement order unjust. As in Re D, the question is whether the outcome was unjust because of a serious procedural irregularity. In this case, there was no injustice because all the relevant information in the reports was disclosed to the parties and before the court in other documents.
“In reaching that conclusion, however, I am not condoning the procedural error. In different circumstances, it could have led to a successful appeal and further delay in reaching a decision about the child's future. The provision in the standard template order, which was properly incorporated into the case management directions in this case on several occasions, is important and where it is included in a court order it must be followed. In this case, however, I am satisfied that no injustice has occurred. It was for those reasons that I concluded that the appeal should be dismissed.”
Lottie Winson




