The 26-week time limit and purposeful delay

Has the 26-week time limit in child care proceedings eliminated purposeful delay? Eleanor Marsh reports on a recent Court of Appeal ruling.

The issue of purposeful delay was considered by the Court of Appeal in Re P (A Child) 2018 EWCA Civ 1483. The salient facts were that the mother had a history of alcohol abuse and one child had died from SIDS one evening when the mother had been drinking. The other child was removed to kinship care. During those proceedings the mother was found to be dishonest. The mother then gave birth to L who was removed at birth by the local authority and care proceedings commenced.

At trial the evidence was that:

(a) the mother had independently engaged with AA;

(b) the mother had been sober for 13 months;

(c) the mother’s contact with L was taking place 4 times per week;

(d) L’s foster carer stated that, in her 30 years of fostering, the mother was one of the most impressive parents she had met in terms of her connection and relationship with L; and

(e) a psychiatrist reported that the mother had made all the progress that could be hoped for or expected and if she achieved another 6 months, there were grounds for optimism that she would achieve long-term sobriety.

The local authority accepted that there had been an improvement but argued that there was a high risk of relapse based on her earlier history. By this time L was 7 months old, so the court was up against the 26-week limit. The mother applied for a 6-month adjournment in the light of the psychiatric assessment.

The trial judge refused the adjournment and made a placement order. He was concerned inter alia about the mother’s history of dishonesty and that further delay would cause attachment difficulties for L.

The Court of Appeal allowed the mother’s appeal on the basis that:

(a) the trial judge had placed too much reliance on the mother’s history of dishonesty;

(b) that serious concern should have been set against the mother’s genuine and significant progress;

(c) there was no evidence that a 6 month adjournment would cause attachment damage to L, particularly in light of frequent, good quality contact and the established relationship between the mother and the child;

(d) the purpose of the adjournment was to establish whether, within L’s timescales, the mother could capitalise on her progress so that L could live with her mother permanently;

(e) it was therefore in L’s best interests to grant the adjournment; and

(f) it could not be said that at the time of the hearing L’s welfare required breaking off all ties to the mother and L’s elder sister.

Eleanor Marsh is a barrister at St Ives Chambers. She can be contacted on 0121 236 0863 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..