Children and deprivation of liberty: further guidance following AGNI
- Details
Graeme Bentley considers a number of recent High Court decisions on deprivation of liberty and what they tell us about confinement and consent where a child has significant disabilities affecting their understanding and ability to communicate their wishes and feelings. This includes both section 20 cases and those where the local authority holds a care order.
Mrs Justice Henke in E (A Child) (Complex Needs: Deprivation of Liberty)[1] provides further guidance following AGNI[2] on the issue of valid consent (one of the three key components in a DOL as per the Storck decision), where the child has significant disabilities that impact both on the care regime that they require and their capacity to communicate their wishes and feelings.
E is 15 years old and has diagnoses of autism and ADHD and significant sensory needs. He has been assessed as having the cognitive age of a child of about two years of age. He has been accommodated by the local authority under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 since October 2020, initially for the purpose of short breaks. He has lived in the same Ofsted-registered children’s home since May 2022. E attended a special needs school until his exclusion in March 2026. He has an EHCP. E currently receives 10 hours of 1:1 tuition and 6 hours of funding to enable him to access the community. E engages with CAMHS. He is prescribed medication. E’s mother (who is actively concerned with his welfare and with whom he stays regularly) consents to his medication. The authorised restrictions under the original order made pre AGNI included locking the external doors and windows of the children’s home; constant 2:1 supervision within the home and in the community; and physical restraint using a harness when travelling by car or minibus [2, 3, 5].
The principles following AGNI
The Judge referred to her earlier judgments in Re B (A Child: Complex Needs: Deprivation of Liberty)[3] and Re C (A Child: Complex Needs: Deprivation of Liberty)[4] setting out the relevant law and drawing the following principles from AGNI [18]:
- When considering the subjective component, Storck (b), consent in this context is distinct from legal capacity and the concept of Gillick competence. A child who does not have legal capacity may nevertheless understand their living arrangements and may be able to express a meaningful view about them. The weight given to that view will vary with the child’s age, maturity and awareness of their situation. Absence of objection may, in some cases, be evident from the absence of conflict, but in others compliance and acquiescence will not be enough. Clear objection by an older child, including repeated attempts to leave, may strongly indicate a deprivation of liberty. Where there is serious doubt, no inference of valid consent should be drawn.
- What matters is the factual capacity of the child to have a basic understanding of their living circumstances in a secure care environment, so that they can, in some suitable way, sufficiently express their view about their situation. Where the true wishes or preferences of the child cannot be ascertained, in an appropriate case the subjective element (Storck (b)) may be met by the views of a person who holds parental responsibility for that child and makes decisions in that child’s best interests.
Holders of parental responsibility may provide valid consent to the confinement by the State of children under 16 years old if the child lacks the factual capacity to consent for themselves, because such a decision, when taken in their best interests, may fall within the zone of that parental responsibility – see Re D[5], with recent examples being found in East Riding of Yorkshire Council v The Mother, The Father and L[6] and Medway Council v The Father and O[7].
E’s care arrangements and wishes
At paragraph [24] the Judge described aspects of E’s care: During waking hours, he is under constant 2:1 supervision and cannot leave the home without supervision. These restrictions go beyond those that a 15-year-old without E’s diagnoses would accept. Their purpose, however, is not to detain E but to keep him safe and supported if he leaves: he does not recognise danger and would otherwise be vulnerable and at risk. With staff support, E can go outside whenever he wishes and take part in a variety of activities, accompanied and assisted by staff. Within the home, he can move about at will and request personal space, although staff generally remain nearby to guide and support him. There is no history of regular physical restraint in this case. Staff use supportive, non-restrictive approaches to calm E. When overwhelmed, he sometimes asks a staff member for a ‘pressure hold’: his term for interlocking arms with a member of staff while gentle pressure is applied. He finds this reassuring.
At paragraph [26] she deals with his wishes and feelings: E appears settled at the children’s home. Although he does not have legal capacity to make decisions for himself, he can express his views. His preferred method of communication is verbal, using short sentences. He reverses ‘me’ and ‘you’, saying, for example, ‘help you’ rather than ‘help me’: he refers to himself as ‘you’ and to others as ‘me’. He also uses his own names for objects and food, calling yoghurt flakes ‘bom boms’. Recently, when his mother asked why he did not want to go to her home, he said ‘that one’ and pointed to a neighbouring property. She understood: it was his previous home, which she had rented before buying her current home, and E wanted to go there rather than stay at her new home. His mother’s evidence is that, when he visits her and asks to return to the children’s home, she takes him. There is no evidence before me that E has ever said that he did not want to return there. He has expressed no dissatisfaction with his living arrangements and has not objected, physically or verbally, to the restrictions in place. E has a basic understanding of his living circumstances and the basic vocabulary to express his wishes if he wishes to do so.
Applying the test to E
Applying the multifactorial assessment as AGNI required, the Judge concluded that the restrictive measures in place go beyond the measures that another 15-year-old without E’s diagnoses would regard as appropriate. However, for E, the restrictions enable him to be kept safe in the children’s home and facilitate his safe access to the world outside the children’s home. The measures are implemented to support and protect E. E has an ability to express himself verbally. In that context, using simple language, he can and does express his views. He has not expressed dissatisfaction with his circumstances in his children’s home or with the restrictive measures. Whilst E functions as a two-year-old and cannot be expected to understand the nuances and ramifications of the secure measures, E does have a basic understanding of the circumstances in which he lives and can express a preference, such as when he asks to leave his mother’s home to go back to the children’s home [28].
The Judge further considered what the position would have been if, contrary to her conclusions, E was found not to have a basic understanding of his circumstances. She indicated that, in those circumstances, the subjective element of consent would be met by E’s mother exercising her parental responsibility in his best interests. As such, given that the subjective element of consent was satisfied and that there was no real and present dispute between the parties, there was no need for the court to consider applying declaratory relief [29]. It took account in relation to declaratory relief generally (as opposed to the inherent jurisdiction in respect of children) which indicated the need for a “real and present dispute between the parties before a court as to the existence or extent of a legal right between them…”[19].
This judgment addresses in particular, parental consent. Other recent judgments of Henke J, however, in the cases of Re B (A Child: Complex Needs: Deprivation of Liberty)[8] and Re (D) (A Child with Complex Needs: Deprivation of Liberty)[9] go further, finding that the subjects, both children in care, were not being deprived of their liberty. In the first of these, the child B was nine years old. She has diagnoses of Autism Spectrum Disorder and Global Developmental Delay and presents with complex behavioural, emotional and developmental needs. She attends a school providing specialist provision for children with additional learning needs. Restrictions that would not be expected of a nine year old included the degree of restraint including the use of reins. The second case, this concerned a child of 12 ½ years, placed in foster care. He has diagnoses of ASD, foetal alcohol syndrome with frontal lobe impairment, mild cerebellar dysplasia and global developmental delay, and undergoing assessment for ADHD. D has very limited verbal communication, is doubly incontinent and requires full support across all areas of his day-to-day living. He would escape if given the opportunity, but this was seen as exploratory behaviour rather than a desire to leave the placement. He requires, for his own protection, continual 1:1 supervision, locked doors and windows and escorted travel to school. The court regarded the objective and subjective elements of Storck as overlapping, there was no evidence of objection by the subject child who was happy and content with their experience.
Parental consent in similar cases
The above scenario is far from uncommon. It is of course vital for legal advisors to look at the individual facts of the case and not to make sweeping generalisations based upon issues of disability. Nevertheless, the judgment provides additional support for those advising in the relatively early days post AGNI in cases where there is no dispute as to the need for the care regime in question for the purposes of the safety of the subject, no indication of objection from the subject child or any professional dispute, and where a parent with parental responsibility for a child under 16 years is able to exercise it appropriately.
While in the present case there was a relative absence of a need for restraint, there was also authority pre AGNI that, where parental responsibility is available to authorise a deprivation of liberty for a child under 16 years, this may extend to the issue of restraint – see, for example, the East Riding case referred to above.
Where the issue of consent is less clear, the court will still need to consider under the multifactorial approach, whether there is a confinement in the first place.
While it remains the case that the local authority cannot provide any consent needed, the fact of the child being subject to a care order will not automatically determine the need for an application to the court. As ever, each case depends upon its own facts. It will be interesting to see how the law develops, in particular, in cases where the child is the subject of a care order, is over 16 and / or requires a greater degree of restraint than appears to have been applicable in any of the above cases.
Graeme Bentley is a Principal Solicitor in Invicta Law’s Child Protection team, with over 40 years of experience in family law.
[1] Re E (A Child) (Complex Needs: Deprivation of Liberty) [2026] EWHC 2896 (Fam)
[2] A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland of a devolution issue under paragraph 34 of Schedule 10 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 [2026] UKSC 16
[3] Re B (A Child: Complex Needs: Deprivation of Liberty) [2026] EWHC 2789 (Fam)
[4] Re C (A Child: Complex Needs: Deprivation of Liberty) [2026] EWHC 2854 (Fam)
[5] Re D [2015] EWHC 3125 (Fam)
[6] East Riding of Yorkshire Council v The Mother, The Father and L [2026] EWHC 181 (Fam)
[7] Medway Council v The Father and O [2026] EWHC 236 (Fam)
[8] Re B (A Child: Complex Needs: Deprivation of Liberty) [2026] EWHC 2789 (Fam)
[9] Re (D) (A Child with Complex Needs: Deprivation of Liberty) [2026] EWHC 2846 (Fam)
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